This paper studies the problem of treatment choice between a status quo treatment with a known outcome distribution and an innovation whose outcomes are observed only in a representative finite sample. I evaluate statistical decision rules, which are functions that map sample outcomes into the planner's treatment choice for the population, based on regret, which is the expected welfare loss due to assigning inferior treatments. I extend previous work that applied the minimax regret criterion to treatment choice problems by considering decision criteria that asymmetrically treat Type I regret (due to mistakenly choosing an inferior new treatment) and Type II regret (due to mistakenly rejecting a superior innovation). I derive exact finite sample solutions to these problems for experiments with normal, Bernoulli and bounded distributions of individual outcomes. In conclusion, I discuss approaches to the problem for other classes of distributions. Along the way, the paper compares asymmetric minimax regret criteria with statistical decision rules based on classical hypothesis tests.
Introduction
Consider a planner who has to choose which one of two mutually exclusive treatments should be assigned to members of a population. One treatment is the status quo, whose effects are well known.
The other is a promising innovation, whose exact effects have yet to be determined. The treatments in question may be, for example, two alternative drugs or therapies for a medical condition, or two different unemployment assistance programs. Suppose that a randomized clinical trial or experiment will be conducted and its results will be used to choose which treatment population members will receive.
The planner faces two problems. First, she has to know what experiment (in particular, what sample size) should be chosen to get a sufficiently accurate estimate of the treatment effect. Second, she has to select how treatment choices will be determined based on the statistical evidence obtained from the experiment. Often, treatment choice is based on the results of a statistical hypothesis test, which is constructed to keep the probability of mistakenly assigning an inferior innovation (a Type I error) below a specified level (usually .05 or .01). Then, the sample size is selected to obtain a high probability (usually .8 or .9) that the innovation will be chosen if its positive effect exceeds some value of interest. Stoye (2007a Stoye ( , 2007b Stoye ( , 2009a and Schlag (2007) . Regret is the difference between the maximum welfare that could be achieved given full knowledge of the effects of both treatments (by assigning the treatment that is actually better) and the expected welfare of treatment choices based on experimental outcomes. The latter is smaller, because experimental outcomes generally do not allow the decision maker to choose the best treatment 100 percent of the time. This paper's main departure from previous literature on the subject is asymmetric consideration of Type I regret (due to mistakenly using an inferior new treatment) and Type II regret (due to missing out on using a superior innovation). The persistent use in treatment choice problems of the hypothesis testing approach, which allows Type II errors to occur with higher probability than Type I errors, suggests that many decision makers want to place the burden of proof on the new treatment. Most do so by selecting a low hypothesis test level, such as  = 05. It is not clear what principles, besides convention, are there to guide the selection of hypothesis test level for the circumstances of a particular decision problem. Values of maximum Type I and maximum Type II regret of a statistical procedure could provide the decision maker with more relevant characteristics of its performance than the traditional hypothesis testing measures (test level and power), since regret takes into account both the probability of making an error and its economic magnitude.
The asymmetric minimax regret criterion proposed here combines minimax regret with a kinked linear welfare function that is intended to capture the policy maker's loss aversion. Maximum Type II regret of asymmetric minimax regret solutions is larger than their maximum Type I regret by a given factor. When treatment effect estimates are normally distributed, hypothesis testing rules with a given level  correspond to asymmetric minimax regret solutions for some asymmetry factor  () for any sample size and variance. It turns out, however, that extreme degrees of loss-aversion are needed to obtain treatment choice rules corresponding to hypothesis tests with standard significance levels.
Instead of looking at maximum regret values, a Bayesian decision maker would assert a subjective probability distribution over the set of feasible treatment outcome distributions, use sample realizations to derive an updated posterior probability distribution, and maximize expected welfare with regard to that posterior distribution (which is equivalent to minimizing expected regret).
Unfortunately, in many situations decision makers do not have any information that would form a reasonable basis for asserting a prior distribution. In group decision making, members of the group may disagree in their prior beliefs. These problems lead to frequent use of conventional prior distributions in applied Bayesian analysis. Bayesian treatment choice based on a conventional prior distribution, rather than on a subjective distribution reflecting the decision maker's prior information, does not have a clear economic justification. Decision making based on maximum regret is a conservative approach to dealing with the lack of reasonable prior beliefs, since maximum regret is the sharp upper bound on expected regret for decision makers with any prior distributions.
The paper proceeds in the following order. Section 2 exposits the decision-theoretic formulation of the problem and introduces the asymmetric minimax regret criterion. In section 3, I consider a simple but instructive case where the experiment generates a normally distributed random variable with known or bounded variance. I analyze conventional treatment choice rules based on hypothesis testing and sample size choice based on power analysis in light of their maximum regret. Section 4 analyzes treatment choice in a more practically applicable setting with binary or bounded random treatment outcomes. Exact mimimax regret results were obtained for these problems by Stoye (2009a) and Schlag (2007) . I extend their results to derive asymmetric minimax regret solutions using a different technique. I also demonstrate that minimax regret solutions proposed by these authors for bounded outcomes could be suboptimal if the decision maker can place an informative upper bound on the variance of the outcome distribution, which is the case in many applications.
In section 5, I discuss the use of approximations, bounds, and numerical methods for problems that do not have convenient analytical solutions and illustrate their performance in a hypothetical clinical trial problem with rare dangerous side effects. All proofs are collected in an appendix.
Statistical treatment rules, welfare and regret
The basic setting is the same as in Manski (2004 Manski ( , 2005 . The planner's problem is to assign members of a large population to one of two available treatments  ∈   = {0 1}. Let  = 0 denote the status quo treatment and  = 1 the innovation. Each member  of the population, denoted , has a response function   () describing that individual's potential outcome under each treatment . The population is a probability space ( Ω  ) and the probability distribution  [ (·)] of the random function  (·) describes treatment response across the population. The population is "large," in the sense that  is uncountable and  () = 0  ∈ .
The planner does not know the probability distribution  , but knows that it belongs to a set of feasible treatment response distributions {    ∈ Γ}.  will be called the state of the world. I assume that average treatment outcomes   [ ()] are finite for all  and .
All population members are observationally identical to the planner, thus the planner's treatment assignment decision can be fully described by an action  ∈   = [0 1], where  denotes the proportion of the target population assigned by the planner to the innovative treatment  = 1. Proportion 1 − , then, is assigned to the status quo treatment  = 0. I assume that fractional treatment assignment (0    1) is carried out randomly.
I consider planners whose welfare from taking action  in state of the world  is the average treatment outcome across the population:
The second line expresses the welfare function in terms of the average treatment effect
which is the primary population statistic of interest to the planner.
The planner conducts an experiment and observes its outcome -a random vector  ∈ X . The probability distribution of  depends on the unknown state of the world  and will be denoted by   . A (random) function  mapping feasible experimental outcomes from X into actions from  will be called a statistical treatment rule (or simply a decision rule). The action chosen by a planner with statistical treatment rule  when  is observed will be denoted by  (). The set of all such functions (feasible statistical treatment rules) will be labeled D.
I follow Wald's (1950) approach and evaluate alternative statistical treatment rules based on the expected welfare they yield across repeated samples in each state of the world . If the planner's welfare function is  ( ) , then the expected welfare from using statistical treatment rule  in state of the world  equals
for all  ∈ Γ with strict inequality at least for one value of . Statistical treatment rule  1 is said to be admissible if there does not exist any  2 ∈ D that dominates  1 , otherwise  1 is called inadmissible.
The analysis of this paper is based on a normalization of the expected welfare called regret.
5
The regret of statistical treatment rule  is the difference between the highest expected welfare achievable by any feasible statistical treatment rule in state of the world  and the expected welfare of statistical treatment rule  :
The highest welfare in state of the world  is achieved by statistical treatment rule  *  () = 1 |   0| that selects the optimal (in state ) treatment regardless of experimental outcomes. The regret function, then, equals
The regret of a statistical treatment rule, thus, is the product of the probability of making an error (assigning an individual to the wrong treatment) and the magnitude of the welfare loss suffered from that error.
Treatment choice based on hypothesis testing
The most common framework used for treatment choice between a status quo treatment and an innovation is hypothesis testing. Typically, the researcher poses two mutually exclusive statistical hypotheses -a null hypothesis  0 :   ≤ 0 that the innovation is no better than the status quo treatment, and an alternative hypothesis  1 :    0 that the innovation is superior. If the null hypothesis is rejected, then treatment  = 1 is assigned to the population. If it is not rejected, the status quo treatment  = 0 is assigned.
Rejecting the null hypothesis when it is, in fact, true (assigning an inferior innovation  = 1 to the population) is called a Type I error. Not rejecting the null hypothesis when it is, in fact, false (assigning the status quo treatment instead of the superior innovation) is called a Type II error. Hypothesis testing procedures are designed to have a certain significance level, which is the probability of making a Type I error (the maximum probability over states of the world  that fall under the null hypothesis). The significance level (also called -level) is usually set at conventional values  = 005 or  = 001. 
A planner who accepts the minimax regret criterion should select a statistical treatment rule that satisfies
and select a sample size such that the maximum regret max
properties of minimax regret were first studied by Milnor (1954) and more recently by Hayashi 
Asymmetric reference-dependent welfare
As a way to express the planner's desire to place the burden of proof on the innovation, I will also consider asymmetric reference-dependent welfare functions. For an asymmetry coefficient   0, let the welfare function  () be linear in the average treatment outcomes with the same slope as  above the reference point   [ (0)] and a  times steeper slope below the reference point.
Formally, define  () as:
The expected welfare for this kinked linear welfare function equals
Ordinal relationships between expected welfare of two statistical decision rules do not depend on the asymmetry factor   0. For any  1   2 ∈ D and  ∈ Γ :
Thus, the set of admissible statistical treatment rules is the same for all asymmetrical linear welfare functions (4) and for the standard linear welfare (1).
The regret function for expected welfare (4) equals
The only difference between this regret function and the regret function for standard linear welfare (2) is the factor  for   ≤ 0. Maximum regret under the asymmetrical welfare function can be expressed through the regret function for linear welfare as
is the maximum Type I regret (maximum regret across states of the world in which the innovation is inferior) under the linear welfare function and
is the maximum Type II regret (maximum regret across states of the world in which the innovation is superior). The names Type I and Type II regret are given in analogy to Type I and Type II errors in hypothesis testing. Type I regret is the welfare loss due to Type I errors, while Type II regret is the welfare loss due to Type II errors under the null hypothesis  0 :   ≤ 0.
Since the asymmetry factor  does not affect admissibility, I will only consider asymmetrical welfare functions indirectly, by solving the weighted minimax regret problem
for the linear expected welfare (1). In problem (5) the planner gives  times greater weight to regret from Type I errors.
Simple normal experiment
I will first consider a very simple experiment whose outcome  ∈ R is a scalar normally distributed random variable with unknown mean   ∈ R and known variance  2 :
While  is a scalar, it need not originate from an experiment with sample size one. For example,  could be a sample average  =
 . Comparing single normal draw experiments with different values of , then, is equivalent to comparing experiments with different sample sizes.
More importantly, the probability distribution of many commonly used statistical estimators of average treatment effect converges to a normal distribution as sample size grows 
in all states of the world). Since the probability of observing  =  equals zero for the normal distribution, it follows that a smaller class of threshold decision rules
is also essentially complete. Thus, considering other rules is not necessary in this problem.
Given that  is normally distributed, the regret of a threshold decision rule   in state of the world  equals
which is the probability of making an incorrect decision multiplied by |  |, the magnitude of the loss incurred from the mistake. Φ denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
Maximum Type I and Type II regret equal
The right-hand equalities are derived by substituting  =   . These functions have finite positive values for every
. Lemma 1 shows that the decision maker faces a trade off between maximum Type I and maximum Type II regret. Higher threshold values imply lower Type I regret, but necessarily higher Type II regret. 
, which happens only at  = 0. The minimax regret treatment rule in this problem is  0 . This is sometimes called the plug-in rule (a plug-in rule takes the estimated value of the average treatment effect and assigns treatments as if it were the true value).
Similarly, the minimax regret statistical treatment rule under asymmetric welfare function
is uniquely characterized by the equation By substituting right-hand expressions from (6), this characterization can be rewritten as
Since only one value of   solves the equation for a given , the threshold of the minimax regret statistical treatment rule is proportional to .
A conventional one-sided hypothesis test with significance level  rejects the null hypothesis ( ≤ 0) and assigns the innovative treatment if   Φ −1 (1 − ). This critical value guarantees that the probability of a Type I error does not exceed  for any   ≤ 0. Since
The statistical treatment rule based on results of a hypothesis test with level  is a threshold rule
For a given test level , the threshold  is proportional to the standard error . Thus a hypothesis test based treatment rule can be rationalized as a solution to an asymmetrical minimax regret problem with asymmetry factor sample size selection in clinical trials. For hypothesis testing, the limit on the probability of Type I errors is traditionally set at 5% or less. The trial sample size is typically selected to limit the probability of Type II errors to 10-20% for a minimal value of the treatment effect that is deemed to have "clinical relevance" or at the anticipated value of the effect of the innovative treatment.
Suppose that a researcher considers bearable the loss of public welfare due to a 10% probability that her innovative treatment could be rejected if its actual treatment effect equals  0. Following the convention, she selects the sample size for which the variance of  equals 2 , where 2 satisfies the condition that  will fall under the 5% hypothesis test threshold  (05) =Φ −1 (95) with probability 10% if   =:
The value of regret that the researcher finds acceptable at   = thus equals 1. This procedure does not make apparent to the researcher that a much larger welfare loss will be suffered at a twice smaller value of   = 146 ≈ 5, where the regret function achieves its maximum of 837 = 286.
Consider now how the sample size would differ if it were selected by the researcher with an explicit objective that maximum regret should equal 1 in two scenarios. First, suppose that the researcher planning the experiment has to take for granted that the decision making will be carried out using a 5% hypothesis test rule. SInce its maximum regret equals 837, she would select sample size such that
which implies sample size that is over 8 times larger than the one selected by power calculations in the example above. In a second scenario, suppose that the researcher has control over treatment assignment and plans to use the minimax regret decision rule  0 . Since the maximum regret of the minimax regret decision rule equals 17, the sample size should be such that
which implies sample size that is almost 3 times smaller than the one selected by power calculations.
Normally distributed outcomes with unknown variance
So far in this section I have assumed that the planner knows the variance of the normally distributed average treatment effect estimate . Suppose now, instead, that the data ( 1     ) consists of  independent normally distributed observations with unknown mean   and unknown variance
Let the set of feasible states of the world be
where  2  0 and 2  ∞ and letΓ
denote the subset of states of the world with the highest feasible outcome variance. Let ≡ 1  P  =1   be the sample mean and
It is well known (cf. Berger, 1985) that the pair ¡   2 ¢ is a sufficient statistic for ( 1     ), thus only decision rules that are functions of and  2 need to be considered. It turns out, however, that decision rules satisfying criteria based on maximum Type I and Type II regret could often be found within a smaller class of threshold decision rules that depend only on the sample mean.
a) maximum Type I and Type II regret of   over the set Γ is the same as over the setΓ:
that has both lower maximum Type I regret and lower maximum Type II regret than   .
Condition (7) ensures that the threshold decision attains maximum Type I and maximum Type II regret on the subsetΓ. If it is not satisfied, the maximum Type I or maximum Type II regret of   could be higher on the set Γ than onΓ, then there maybe exists a non-threshold decision rule that has both lower Type I and lower Type II regret than   .
It follows from Proposition 2 that threshold decision rules that satisfy minimax regret or asymmetric minimax regret criteria for outcomes with fixed variance (set of feasible states of the world Γ) also satisfy the corresponding criteria for outcomes with bounded variance (set of feasible states
Γ) if their threshold values satisfy condition (7)
. The range of thresholds for which condition (7) holds depends on the ratio
In the opposite extreme case
In particular, since a threshold rule with  = 0 is the symmetric minimax regret decision rule in the problem with known variance, it also minimizes maximum regret in the problem with unknown variance.
Exact statistical treatment rules for binary and bounded outcomes
Exact solutions to the minimax regret problems and exact maximum regret values are available when the data  consists of  independent random outcomes of treatment  = 1, provided that the outcomes are binary or have bounded values. I will first consider the case of binary outcomes and then its extension to outcomes with bounded values.
Binary outcomes
Let the treatment outcomes of the innovative treatment  = 1 be binary, w.l.o.g. let  (1) ∈ {0 1}, and let the known average outcome of the status quo treatment
Let the set of feasible probability distributions of  (1) be a set of Bernoulli distribution with 
are admissible and form an essentially complete class, thus it is sufficient to consider only monotone rules. The regret of a monotone rule   equals
where  (    ) denotes the binomial probability density function with parameters  and   and   ≡   −  0 .
It will be convenient to use a one-dimensional index for monotone rules
There is a one to one correspondence between index values  ∈ [0  + 1] and the set of all distinct monotone decision rules.  = 0 corresponds to the decision rule that assigns all population members to the innovation, no matter what the experimental outcomes are.  =  + 1 corresponds to the most conservative decision rule that always assigns the status quo treatment.
Lemma 3 establishes properties of maximum Type I and Type II regret of monotone statistical treatment rules for binomially distributed  that lead to simple characterisations of minimax regret and asymmetric minimax regret treatment rules. As before, maximum Type I regret is
 ( ) and maximum Type II regret is    () ≡ max Likewise, there is a unique value
is the minimax regret statistical treatment rule for asymmetric reference dependent welfare function  () .
The following proposition derives the exact large sample limit of maximum regret of minimax regret statistical treatment rules. Unlike in the normal case covered in Section 3, the minimax regret rule in the Bernoulli case does not generally coincide with the plug-in rule:
In large samples, however, the difference between   and   has little effect on maximum regret.
Proposition 4 shows that as sample size grows, the maximum regret of minimax regret rules and plug-in rules (normalized by √  ) converge to the same limit. That limit is the same as minimax regret in a problem with  normally distributed outcomes with fixed variance  0 (1 −  0 ).
Proposition 4
Asymptotic maximum regret of both minimax regret and plug-in statistical treat-ment rules is equal to
Bounded outcomes
Now consider a more general setting. Let the outcomes of treatment  = 1 be bounded variables 
Verbally, this extension can be described as a simple process: 
as lower asymptotic maximum regret than a binomial average extension of   , a minimax regret statistical treatment rule in the Bernoulli case.
and let {    ∈ Γ} be the set of feasible probability distributions
Maximum regret of binomial average extension  is by design the same as the maximum regret of the minimax regret treatment rule   in the Bernoulli case. As long as for some ∆  0 Γ contains distributions with all possible means in a ∆-neighborhood of  0
the results of proposition 4 apply and
Thus, for large enough  , max
This underscores the importance of placing appropriate restrictions on the set of feasible treatment outcome distributions before looking for minimax regret or asymmetric maximum regret based treatment rules.
Evaluating regret using approximations and bounds
In conclusion, I would like to discuss methods for dealing with statistical problems which do not have neat finite sample solutions such as described in the previous sections and give an example illustrating their properties. I will restrict attention to the case when the data consists of  i.i.d. The regret of a threshold decision rule   equals
To evaluate maximum Type I and Type II regret of   ,
the planner needs to know, for each value of , the range of feasible probabilities that the sample mean exceeds the threshold  . Note that for each ,
is non-decreasing in  , thus solutions to minimax regret and asymmetric minimax regret problems can be easily found if the researcher has a way to evaluate
expression is well studied in statistics. I will consider three main approaches: brute force calculation or simulation, normal approximation, and large deviation bounds.
Brute force calculation or simulation The main challenge for calculation or simulation is in selecting a finite set of feasible distributions that reliably approximates sup
for different values of . For some distributions (e.g. for discrete distributions with small finite support) such a set is easily constructed by creating a "grid" of distributions with different parameter values. In nonparametric problems, however, it may be difficult to construct a finite set of distributions that will be certain to reliably approximate sup
If an insufficiently rich set of distributions is chosen, the approximation will be lower than actual maximum regret.
Normal approximation With the knowledge of
planner can use the normal approximation
To evaluate maximum Type I and Type II regret of a threshold decision rule it is sufficient to know minimum and maximum feasible variance  2  for each feasible value of   . Normal approximations of tail probabilities of could be either higher or lower than the actual values, thus approximate values of maximum Type I/II regret could also be either above or below actual values.
Large deviation bounds There are a number of inequalities for tail probabilities of the distribution of sample mean. Using these inequalities allows the statistician to construct finite sample upper bounds on maximum Type I and Type II regret. Unlike normal approximations, bounds constructed using large deviation inequalities are guaranteed not to be lower than actual maximum Type I/II regret values, which may be useful for conservative decision making.
The simplest large deviation bound is given by the one-sided Chebyshev's inequality, which requires only that  0   have bounded variance:
If outcome variables are bounded   ∈ [ ], then Hoeffding's exponential inequality (1963, Theorem 2) applies to the tail probabilities of:
Hoeffding's inequality was used by Manski (2004) to compute bounds on maximum regret of plug-in (empirical success) treatment rules.
If a feasible distribution has finite absolute third moment
could be derived from the Berry-Esseen inequality:
Lowest proven values for the constants  0 and  1 are  0 ≤ 07975 (van Beek, 1972) and  1 ≤ 32 (Paditz, 1989) . For large enough sample sizes, the Berry-Esseen inequality could show that the tail probabilities are arbitrarily close to their normal approximation, which is significantly smaller than the Chebyshev's and Hoeffding's bounds. Figure 4 shows that among threshold decision rules, minimax regret is attained by the decision rule with threshold  = 51 rather than by the plug-in rule, and its maximum regret equals .0230.
A numerical example
In this example, the large deviation bounds on maximum regret are much higher than its actual values, while normal approximations are significantly lower. Both of them suggest that the plug-in decision rule minimizes maximum regret, even though its maximum regret is 12%
higher than the minimum attainable by a different threshold decision rule. The difference between these approximations and actual maximum regret presents a bigger problem for the selection of trial sample size. Using the normal approximation to evaluate maximum regret could lead the statistician to choose sample size about 40% smaller than is necessary to make decisions with the desired maximum regret. Using the large deviation bounds, on the other hand, could lead her to choose a sample size almost five times larger than necessary.
Normal approximations and large deviation bounds provide convenient and tractable methods for evaluating maximum regret of threshold decision rules. This example shows, however, that even in realistic problems with fairly large sample size, they could significantly misrepresent the maximum regret of decision rules. Whenever possible, such results should be verified by direct computation or simulation.
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6 Appendix: Proofs Lemma 1 I will prove the results in part a), the proof of part b) is analogous. Note that it is w.l.o.g. to set  = 1 to simplify notation, then 
The second line follows from an well known inequality for the normal distribution:
For any   0 and   0,
2 with respect to  shows that max
is achieved at  = − and equals
Proposition 2 a) If   0, then the maximum Type II regret of threshold decision rule   over the set Γ equals
The third line uses substitutions  ≡ Application of the uniform Berry-Esseen inequality to , which is a sum of  independent Bernoulli random variables with mean   (cf. Shiryaev (1995, p. 63)), yields
